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ECONOMIC MEASURE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS  
UNDER DISASTER RISK AND MITIGATION POLICY 
 
Kiyoshi KOBAYASHI, Muneta YOKOMATSU 
Kyoto University 
 
ABSTRACT: The calculation of expected-losses-reduction, adopted in practices of cost-benefit analysis of 
disaster mitigation investment, fails to capture the catastrophic features of disaster, most typically 
characterized by large magnitudes of collective damage. The risk management methods to cope with disaster 
can be classified into two categories: risk control through disaster mitigation and risk finance to allocate 
catastrophe risks through market transactions. The paper claims that the cost-benefit evaluation of mitigation 
investment should reflect social applicability of risk finance technology to take into account the catastrophic 
aspects of natural disaster. The paper presents an extended framework of economic valuation of catastrophe 
risk mitigation and summarizes remaining issues to be concurred in future research.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent advancement of disaster mitigation 
technologies has remarkably reduced arrivals of 
damages caused by natural disasters while capital 
accumulation in urban areas has increased the risks 
of catastrophic losses whose scales are 
unprecedented in history. Large scaled disaster 
seldom occurs, but once it hits a great number of 
people, firms and organizations are deprived a large 
amount of wealth simultaneously. This study is 
concerned with the question of how we can manage 
such large and collective risks, which may be termed 
as `catastrophe risks'. 
 
Traditional cost-benefit analysis evaluates 
economic benefits of disaster mitigation investment 
by expected losses reduction. This method, however, 
is appropriate only for evaluating risks whose scales 
are relatively small and whose arrivals are mutually 
independent. In other words, it has the limitations in 
application and it cannot be adapted to calculation of 
economic benefits of mitigation investment that aims 
for reducing catastrophe risks such as earthquakes 
characterized by large losses and collectiveness. 
New paradigm is necessary to be introduced, which 
is consistent with the catastrophic features of disaster 
risks. 
 
Both means, i.e., `risk control' such as disaster 
mitigation and `risk finance' like disaster insurance 
should be combined to cope with catastrophic risks. 
The recent development of financial technologies 
has expanded the channels of risk spreading, 
resulting in discounting premium rates and 
increasing the capacity corresponding to the large 
claims. It is further expected that popularization of 
disaster insurance cultivate households' cognizance 
of disaster risks that they actually face. The effective 
coordination of technologies of risk control and ones 
of risk finance is required to construct the disaster 
risk management systems. 
 
The cost-benefit analysis fills the role of 
evaluating value of a certain types of risk control 
technologies by estimating the willingness-to-pay in 
the prevailing market. Applying the cost-benefit 
analysis, wasteful investment will be cut in advance. 
Hence the formulation of cost-benefit analysis must 
be expanded, and the total risk management system 
must be constructed, incorporating voluntary 
prevention of risks by each household and so on, and 
further the new methodology is expected to help 
information on disaster risks widely communicated 
in society. This study suggests the fundamental 
concepts of cost-benefit analysis in the market where 
catastrophe risks exist, and points out what is 
remained for future studies. 
 
2. THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF 
CATASTROPHE RISKS 
 
2.1 Previous studies 
There has been large literature, both theoretical and 
empirical, about economic valuation under 
uncertainty (e.g. Johansson, 1993). Economic 
benefits of seismic risk mistigation have been 
estimatied in Japan (e.g. Ueda, 1997, Takagi et 
al.,1996). But most studies implicitly assume that 1) 
scale of events is small, 2) occurrence of events is 
mutually independent. They have not focused on the 
above-mentioned factors, `low probability' and 
`collectivity'. On the contrary, one hit of disaster 
brings about a large number of victims who are 
seriously damaged. There have not accumulated the 
studies about evaluation methods that focused on the 
peculiarities of disaster risks, which are low 
probabilities, simultaneous arrivals and serious 
damage. On the other hand, regarding to collective 
risks, there are studies where optimal allocation 
among individuals has been analyzed. The social 
benefits of avoiding risks have conventionally been 
defined by summation of individuals' benefits of the 
avoidance. But the collective feature of catastrophe 
risks will not accept the conventional method, 
namely the benefits brought by catastrophe 
avoidance must not be simple accumulation, without 
taking the correlation into account, of individuals' 
benefits of the avoidance. Besides, there exists the 
study where benefits of avoiding the irreversible 
catastrophe risks whose hit makes state impossible to 
be recovered are evaluated (Johansson, 1995). For 
example, once catastrophic event such as explosions 
in a nuclear plant occurs, all the households are 
probable to die. Since deaths of all the households 
arrive simultaneously, they can be substituted by 
death of the representative household, and the 
evaluation of benefits of catastrophe aversion can be 
replaced to the one of death aversion of the 
representative household. And here, since the 
catastrophic event is represented as `doomsday', 
there remained no room for discussing about 
allocation of damage. 
 
2.2 Catastrophe risks 
As for disaster risks, both aspects should be 
considered: collective and individual risks. The 
former refers to the aggregated amounts of losses 
suffered by a certain group, while the latter 
corresponds to actual allocation of the level of losses 
to each household. Then, disaster risks can be 
represented by `compound lottery' that is composed 
of two stages, which respectively correspond to 
determination of collective risks and one of 
individual risks. At the first stage of the lottery, the 
number of victims, N, (or, equivalently, the total 
amounts of losses) is drawn from the lottery box. At 
the second stage, the names of N victims are 
determined, that is individual risks are 
discriminatingly allocated among households. This 
model straightforward points out the essential 
structure of initial allocation of disaster risks. 
 
By the way, automobile insurance spreads 
individual risks. With regard to the risks like traffic 
accidents, where damage of contractors are not 
correlated, individual risks are completely spread in 
the pool of the premiums paid by the contractors, i.e. 
traditional mutual insurance. Since total amounts of 
losses in a certain period can be predicted almost 
precisely by law of large numbers, and losses of 
victims can be always fully covered by accumulated 
premiums of contractors. On the contrary, as for 
disaster risk, the number of victims is stochastic 
variable, which we call `collective risks'. For the 
former case of traffic risks, the benefits of reducing 
the risks are calculated by the expected losses 
reduction, it follows that the individual benefits are 
identical to the discount of the premiums and the 
social benefits are equal to the scale-down of the 
insurance pool. On the other hand, the latter case of 
disaster risks has additional aspect, collective risks, 
hence the benefits cannot be evaluated similarly. 
Then, how? 
 
The question we have to ask first is about 
spreading the risk of `lottery of the first stage'. It is 
apparent that the pool given by households in a 
region or disaster insurance of the traditional type is 
insufficient to hedge great collective risks. Insurance 
money must be raised from international capital 
markets. The greater the losses, the more money 
must be made in order to recover the state. 
Consequently, economic benefits of disaster 
prevention investment are evaluated by the costs that 
would be necessitated to hedge the catastrophe risks 
in the international capital markets if the investment 
were not implemented. 
 
2.3 Risk control and risk finance 
There exist a number of technologies applied to the 
management of disaster risks. These technologies 
can be roughly classified into the means for risk 
control and the ones for risk finance. The former 
 
Figure 1. Risk control and risk finance 
 
corresponds to any means to reduce the magnitudes 
of losses and damages caused by disasters. The latter 
refers to institutional arrangement to distribute 
disaster risks among potential victims. Anti-disaster 
proof facilities play role of risk control that mitigate 
either probabilities or losses brought by disaster. As 
well, emergency systems of refuge and guide, 
management technologies of traffic, information and 
communication systems, and methods of restoration 
works are categorized to risk control methods. On 
the other hand, disaster insurance is representative 
technology of risk finance, which state-dependently 
reallocates the wealth. Note that even if damaged 
households can be compensated by insurance claims, 
total losses in society brought by disaster are 
remained to be unchanged. Losses are not 
disappeared but transferred from victims to 
undamaged households. The basic differences 
between the two methods are characterized in Figure 
1, where the sizes of the circles represent the amount 
of the total monetary losses caused by certain 
disaster. Risk-control methods basically orient to 
mitigate the total monetary losses that could be 
generated by the disaster, while risk finance methods 
apply to reduce the damages of the victims by 
shifting part of the losses of the victims to the 
undamaged persons, remaining the size of the circle 
constant. If institutional arrangements of risk finance 
are insufficiently equipped in society, losses are 
likely to be concentrated upon a relatively few 
risk control
risk finance
households and the psychological damage of the 
victims will be enormous. But if losses are 
distributed widely, the damage per capita is 
mitigated. The benefit-evaluation based on expected 
losses reduction takes only the sizes of the circles in 
Figure 1 into account, and neglects the benefits 
related to the psychological damage of each 
household. 
 
3. PROBLEMS IN EVALUATION OF 
DISASTER RISK MITIGATION 
 
3.1 Limitations of evaluation based on expected 
losses reduction 
Traditional cost-benefit analysis evaluates the 
economic benefits of disaster prevention investment 
by amounts of expected losses reduction brought by 
the investment. This method is, however, 
theoretically justified only if none of the following 
three conditions is violated; 1) losses of households 
are fully covered by disaster insurance payments, 2) 
ex ante states are instantly recovered by the 
payments (there is no time lag), 3) Principle of Lexis 
is satisfied, which requires that premium for 
contractor are equal to its respective expected claim 
payments. The improvement of financial markets has 
discounted premium to some extent, but insurance 
industries are still faced with risks and risk premium 
(safety loading added to expected claim payments) is 
included in insurance premium unless collective 
risks are completely diminished. Therefore Principle 
of Lexis is still far from being satisfied and since 
some multiplier, which is greater than 1, marks up 
pure premium (equal to expected claim payments), 
households are not motivated to purchase insurance 
of full cover contract (Kobayashi et al., 2000). 
Unless losses cannot be perfectly compensated by 
insurance, households cannot wipe off the mental 
damage that comes from uncertain future completely. 
Hence the economic evaluation cannot go ahead  
Figure 2. Capital accumulation and disaster risk 
 
without considering how losses by disaster are 
actually and initially allocated. 
 
3.2 Mental Damage and Risk Premium 
Let us reveal one of the limitations of the 
expected-losses-evaluation method. Consider time 
series where assets of a certain household who do 
not apart from its native land throughout its life are 
accumulated (Yokomatsu et al., 2000a). Suppose that 
the household makes portfolio composed of 
monetary assets and physical assets. Monetary assets 
are assumed to be safe assets that gain constant 
interest every period. On the other hand, by physical 
assets, we represent houses and furniture, which are 
faced with risks of being damaged by disaster.  
 
Figure 2 shows the household's total assets 
growing process. Assume for simplicity that the 
household faces no risks other than disaster risks. 
The path A represents the assets accumulating 
process in the circumstance where no disaster risk 
exists. Now, assume the circumstance where 
physical assets are faced with disaster risks, and the 
path B represents the process when disaster occurs at 
time θ . Now, since insurance premium rates are 
marked up, the rational household has no incentive 
to purchase full-cover-insurance and only parts of 
the losses are compensated at the time of disaster. 
Hence ex ante position of the wealth is not recovered 
í
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instantly. The typical process is represented by the 
path B, where at time θ  the household readjusts the 
share between monetary assets and physical assets, 
and the accumulation process of the second period 
starts. The second process necessarily goes below 
the path A, that is, mental damage lasts for long time 
until the second path converges to the imaginary 
path. This kind of losses brought by disaster is 
regarded as `ex post losses'. 
 
Now, anti-disaster proof facilities are provided. 
Owing to them, the losses by the disaster at θ  are 
mitigated and the accumulation path is shifted up to 
the path B . The shift is resolved into two effects. 
The first effect is brought at θ , namely in (ex post) 
state of disaster, where anti-disaster proof facility 
mitigates losses actually given by the hit of disaster. 
It is illustrated by the shift from the point b to the 
upper restarting point b , which affects the restarted 
asset accumulation process. We call this effect `ex 
post mitigation effect'. On the other hand, the path 
B  is different from the path B even in this first 
period. Anti-disaster proof facilities reduce expected 
losses, and therefore decrease premium rates and 
insurance premiums, and it follows that those 
savings of the premiums are substituted for 
investment to its assets. Hence assets growing 
process is shifted not only at the time of occurrence 
of disaster but throughout household's life. We call 
the second effect that is independent of the time of 
disaster, `ex ante accumulation effect'.  
 
Whether households make full-cover-contracts or 
not depends on the existence of risk premiums 
included in disaster insurance premiums. Let us 
define risk premium for the time being by the value 
that is got when premium is divided by expected 
claim payment. If the Principle of Lexis is satisfied, 
the risk premium is equal to the minimum value, 1. 
Yokomatsu et al. (2000a) proved theoretically that if 
Cobb=Douglas utility function is adopted to 
represent preference of household, total benefits 
composed of `ex ante accumulation effect' and `ex 
post mitigation effect' are just equal to the amounts 
that is got when the amounts of expected losses 
reduction is multiplied by the risk premium 
prevailed in the market. This index of the benefits 
seems simple and useful. However, disaster 
insurance market, especially we pay attention to one 
in Japan, has not advanced yet, and we cannot 
observe correct value of the risk premium that 
reflects actual disaster risks in respective regions. 
But in the year 2002, the Japan's financial market 
was opened, and disaster insurance market is now 
predicted to become competitive rapidly. In result, 
information about the risk premium will be 
accumulated and it will be possible to apply the 
evaluation method based on the market. 
 
3.3 Sophistication of cost-benefit calculation of 
disaster mitigation investment 
In order to mitigate catastrophe risks, not only 
projects implemented by governments but role of 
financial markets and self-prevention activities of 
households are required as components of the total 
disaster management. Accordingly cost-benefit 
analysis of disaster prevention investment needs to 
be sophisticated to be consistent with the total risk 
management system. Damage brought by 
catastrophe risks, incorporating mental damage as 
well, must be more precisely estimated and predicted, 
and detailed information about disaster risks must be 
opened to the public. Those activities are mutually 
promoted with risk communication between 
governments and regional inhabitants. The benefits 
evaluation of public investment is not independent of 
households' private activities for losses mitigation. In 
subsection 3.2, the index of the benefits of disaster 
prevention investment was identified as the product 
of expected losses reduction and the risk premium of 
disaster insurance. Note that the model, which 
derives the index, assumes household's rational 
behavior regarding to avoiding risks such as 
purchasing insurance in the market, and further the 
household is gifted with a sense of self-responsibility. 
If household violates such normative behaviors 
based on self-responsibility, its willingness-to-pay 
for anti-disaster facilities provided by government, 
namely the economic benefits of the facilities, will 
be much greater than the normative one. But even if 
such benefits are identified as great amounts, 
needless to say, it is inefficient to mitigate all the 
risks by public projects. Policies that introduce 
households' efforts for private mitigation must be 
implemented, taking calculation of costs into 
account. The value of the risk premiums observed in 
the disaster insurance market gives us valuable 
information about possibility of households' private 
mitigation, indirectly through the amount of 
expected losses reduction driven by public 
investment. 
 
4. SELF-RESPONSIBILITY-PRINCIPLE AND 
MARKET EVALUATION OF DISASTER 
MITIGATION EFFECTS 
 
4.1 Technologies of risk finance and disaster 
insurance 
In 1990's, there increased rapidly the payments of 
premiums in reinsurance market of disaster 
insurance. Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 
Northridge earthquake in 1994 particularly 
motivated this trend. For compensating the parts of 
the losses brought by the former, $18.3 billions of 
insurance money were paid (estimated by Swiss Re.), 
and for the latter, the total payments were achieved 
$13.5 billions (estimated by Swiss Re.). One of the 
reasons is that people with high income concentrated 
in those regions, resulting in increasing the risk of 
great amounts of insurance payments. Compared 
with the demand, the scale of the international 
nonlife insurance markets (including reinsurance 
markets) is too small to absorb such growing risks. 
Hence in order to resolve the problem, it was 
proposed and has been implemented that insurance 
pool is expanded by transaction of disaster securities 
(CAT bond) in international capital markets that are 
incomparably larger than nonlife insurance markets. 
Disaster risks are uncorrelated to economic risks so 
that speculators are able to spread risks by 
composing effective portfolios. This methodology is 
equivalent to one suggested in the model where 
collective risks, which is determined in the first stage 
of `compound lottery', are hedged by transaction of 
CAT bond in security market. Kobayashi et al.(2000) 
formulates an ideal disaster insurance, which 
contains the function of CAT bond for making 
money for payments, supplied in the ideal security 
market, where Pareto optimal risk allocation is 
attained. As for this type of the disaster insurance, 
the risk premium defined in the preceding section is 
not equal to 1, but more than or less than 1 owing to 
risks households face respectively. Furthermore, it 
must be impossible practically to design the disaster 
insurance system that precisely corresponds to each 
sample in the sample space of states defined by 
combinations of individual risks and collective risks. 
Practical disaster insurance is nothing more than one 
that roughly corresponds to the samples. 
Accordingly insurance industries also have to take 
risks of insolvency so that additional safety loading 
will be far from negligible. A lot of important works 
are remained for future, for example, CAT bond 
should be designed more practically and precisely in 
order to reflect the idiosyncrasies of disaster risks, 
and moreover, the methodology of determining 
values of risk premiums should be invented. 
 
4.2 Disaster insurance, risk communication, and 
self-responsibility-principle 
Effects of disaster insurance are not only 1) to fund 
for damaged households' reconstruction, but 2) to 
make households have incentive to prevent their own 
risks as much as possible with sense of 
self-responsibility. For example, suppose that 
premium rates are so designed as to decrease 
inverse-proportionally to the degree of anti-disaster 
proof level of private building that is an object of 
insurance. Now households will have incentive to 
strengthen structures of buildings in order to save 
payments for the insurance premiums. As is 
mentioned above, theoretically, disaster insurance 
can induce households' private preventing behaviors, 
and popularization of disaster insurance and 
enhancement of households' consciousness of risk 
management and activation of their private 
mitigation complementarily make progress. However, 
seeing the present market condition in Japan, disaster 
insurance is far from being popularized. The reasons 
why insurance is not purchased are considered in 
several ways, such as lack of risk information, moral 
hazard and so on. The moral hazard in this context 
means that households are likely to lack incentive to 
purchase insurance voluntarily in market when they 
expect some relief programs for actual victims of 
disasters implemented by governments. Those kinds 
of imperfect cognition, moral hazard, and existence 
of transaction costs distort market allocation of risks, 
resulting in market failure. On the other hand, 
policies of governments that enforce compulsory 
insurance as institution can be suggested. For 
example, regional governments, which are expected 
to hold more precise information about risks of 
respective regions than households and act better 
against risks with less moral hazard, can levy the 
taxes from respective inhabitants as insurance 
premium, and buy the disaster insurance in the 
market to insure the losses of the inhabitants 
(Yokomatsu et al., 2000b). In some circumstances, 
mixed insurance system, where compulsory 
insurance and market insurance are combined, may 
be valuable (see e.g. Blomqvist et al., 1997). 
However those compulsory systems can, as well, be 
objected with a foundation that unlike the 
automobile insurance which aims at protecting the 
injured, disaster insurance is nothing more than one 
which compensates the wealth of the owners 
themselves, and the compulsion may violates the 
property right. Moreover compulsory systems may 
deprive households of opportunities where they 
recognize their respective risks by insurance 
premium, namely, opportunities of risk 
communication in market. Hence advanced studies 
must be accumulated, which examine more desirable 
institution of disaster insurance from many aspects, 
resolving households' imperfect cognition of risks 
and moral hazard. 
 
4.3 Efficient allocation and fair allocation of risks 
One of most important future directions of the 
cost-benefit analysis based on the disaster insurance 
market will be to include the problem of fair 
allocation of risks among individuals. Kobayashi et 
al. (2000) proved that the equilibrium solution in the 
market, where the disaster insurance is transacted, 
surely attains Pareto efficient allocation of 
catastrophe risks, on the other hand, larger amounts 
of wealth are allocated to the households whose 
expected marginal utility is smaller (who own larger 
amounts of wealth). Namely, we gain more 
regressive allocation of wealth than one which is 
given if we adopt the social welfare function where 
households' expected utility functions are simply 
added. In other words, the buyers of the disaster 
insurance are wealthy households, and relatively 
poor households have less incentive to buy the 
insurance. For the purpose of equitable allocation, 
some policies by governments are required, and 
again, compulsory insurance system might be 
investigated although it is equipped 
above-mentioned problems. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Economic benefits of disaster prevention investment 
have conventionally been evaluated by expected 
losses reduction. Once disaster hits, a great number 
of people, firms and organizations are deprived of a 
large amount of wealth simultaneously. The 
traditional method based on expected losses 
reduction is faced by the limitation that it cannot be 
applied to the market of catastrophe risks where 
securities that do not satisfy the Principle of Lexis 
are transacted. This study referred to the 
categorization of technologies of risk management 
into risk control such like anti-disaster proof 
facilities and risk finance such like disaster insurance. 
In order to manage growing risks in society, the total 
risk management system must be constructed, where 
methods of risk control and ones of risk finance are 
effectively and consistently combined. In addition, 
the frame of the cost-benefit analysis must be 
sophisticated. This paper insisted that cost-benefit 
analysis based on self-responsibility-principle should 
take risk premium into account. Future study 
examines how our conclusion is consistent with 
hypothetical compensation principles and 
compensation tests, considering the possibility 
of governments’ intergenerational risk sharing 
policy.  
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